Guerre en Iran. Quelles questions stratégiques ?

War in Iran:

The Strategic Implications. Recent events have

compelled a recalibration of our Rendez-Vous de la Géopolitique agenda to

concentrate on the ongoing situation in Iran. We’re recording this session on the

sixth day into the ongoing airstrikes. Navigating the sheer volume of daily reports

and the complexity of these rapidly changing circumstances,

we have opted to explore this topic through the lens of key strategic questions,

setting aside the immediate need for reactive analysis. The decision by Israel and the USA

to attack Iran is significant and will inevitably have

major geopolitical consequences. However, to understand

these consequences, we should first examine the current strategic implications. We’ll tackle these issues

with Fabrice Ravel. Hello, Fabrice.

Hello, Olivier. Hello, everyone. As we are in the thick of current

events, drawing lessons from unfolding events presents a challenge. We will thus take a slightly

unconventional approach. Rather than providing immediate answers,

we will pose questions that I am sure will prove to be highly instructive. By framing our discussion around the

questions raised in the title: ‘The Strategic Implications’, we simply

want to highlight that it is far too early—

as we are only on the sixth day

of the war— to draw any lessons

or definitive conclusions capable of standing

the test of time. War takes a long time, and sometimes a

very long time, whereas media reactions are often

particularly short-lived. I’ll start with

a quick clarification of terms

before outlining the essential geopolitical and strategic

questions we need to address. Regarding the term 'war': make no mistake,

irrespective of the conflict's duration, we are indeed

talking about a war. Given the direct confrontation between

three states and the sheer scale of the military resources

deployed, the current situation far exceeds the scope

of the June 2025 operation. As we begin to outline

the key strategic issues, we’ll soon realise

just how many there are. This point is critical in its own right:

the sheer scale alone of the conflict we are defining today

illustrates the gravity of the consequences we should

expect in geopolitical and geostrategic terms. I believe five aspects

merit particular attention. Let’s start with an essential first one:

what are the real objectives of

the three main belligerents? Second, what can historical precedents teach

us about the current geopolitical logic? In other words,

what trends are already taking shape, and what are their

likely outcomes as we map them out? Third, it’s also critical to

wonder what will be the reaction of

American society to the outbreak of a conflict in Iran. Fourth: what

military resources are actually available to US forces in this conflict,

and do they align with their stated objectives? Finally,

we must consider the fifth, and perhaps most evident, question:

what strategic shifts will this war in Iran trigger within China and

Beijing’s outlook? This question clearly arises

because the conflict will undoubtedly trigger a review

of strategic posture, likely concentrated

along a singular axis. Having established

these objectives, let’s now examine them in greater detail. First: the objectives

driving the belligerents. As I map out this hierarchy,

I will begin with the belligerent whose objectives

are most transparent, before moving on to address

the belligerents whose objectives are

more numerous, complex, but also less

immediately apparent. For Israel,

the objective is clear: the definitive dismantlement and

eradication of the Islamic Republic’s political system as it exists in Iran. There’s no need to dwell on this at length. That objective is so clear

it requires no elaboration. Turning to the Islamic

Republic of Iran, however, the strategic reality is significantly

more complex. There is an inherent symmetry that

appears quite readily: for the Islamic Republic of Iran,

the primary objective is to survive this war and these attacks, and to take up

a long-term position. Among the

events of the first six days, one in particular

warrants close examination in this context of this question. Which event in particular? Notably, Iran initiated

a broad series of airstrikes against numerous neighbours, demonstrating

the full operational range of its ballistic missile and drone arsenal. This entails two possible

interpretations. What are these two interpretations? Some observers offer

a somewhat simplistic interpretation:

they argue that these attacks are

disorganised and aimless. They suggest that

the intensity of American and Israeli strikes, coupled with

the disarray of the Iranian political establishment,

has dismantled the coherence of the leadership, leaving

individual units and commanders

to act without any real consultation. That suggests a disintegrating Iranian regime,

signalling the onset of collapse or panic. Perhaps. However, there is a second interpretation:

that this is an entirely controlled

and planned strategy, designed to achieve a series of objectives. There are at least four objectives that

I would highlight. I can describe them

as concentric circles; each successive layer

possesses a broader and more general scope

as it expands. The first circle

is clearly the intention to try to

destabilise all regional actors and, beyond that, international actors, by

targeting in particular all energy facilities, whether they are production

sites—which appear to be intended for export—but also

consumption centres, in order to destabilise these societies and pressure them

into urging the USA and Israel to end the war as quickly as possible. However, upon closer reflection,

a second circle emerges. This second circle involves leveraging

the sentiments of minority Shia communities within Iran's sphere of influence. Bear in mind that while I did say

minority, the Shia community actually holds the majority in Iraq. The underlying intent clearly

seeks to shatter the complacency of regional observers,

compelling them to focus on what’s happening in

Iran and ultimately entangling them in the broader conflict. There may also be a third circle

that builds upon the one I have just outlined. Beyond mere Shia sensibilities,

Iran appears to be cultivating a broader appeal to the imagination of the wider

Muslim world, spanning both Shia and Sunni populations.

Through these actions, they intend to underscore their status as a frontline

combatant against the USA and Israel, effectively framing their

operations within the context of civilisational solidarity. I would argue that this approach is highly

sophisticated, as it aims to create a significant rift or

drive a wedge between these populations and their political leadership.

In particular, the Gulf monarchies —despite their close strategic alignment with

the United States—could face a critical disconnect as their

domestic public opinions begins to shift. Extending this framework,

we should consider a fourth circle, one frequently disregarded,

which posits a transition into total systemic disintegration.

Should Iran’s state structure collapse, we face two distinct and divergent

strategic trajectories. Either a revolution, or a civil war. A pertinent question is

why the Gulf governments seem so wary

of sudden revolutions or major schisms

on their doorstep. They likely fear

that such instability could, through a contagion effect,

trigger similar domestic movements within

their own borders. In my view,

this interpretation is far more rational, considered, and strategic,

particularly since it provides a framework that

allows us to move beyond basic questions and derive more

profound strategic insights. You’ve mentioned two belligerents,

but there is still a third one that we haven’t addressed yet. It’s the USA,

whose objectives seem less clear if one is to believe the comments. That’s putting it mildly. Because you might start by pointing out that

we seem to be wavering between three different objectives. We could even imagine four if

we combine these three objectives that I am about to outline. Because ultimately,

what is Washington’s primary objective? Essentially, it’s to definitively

prevent Iran from gaining access to, or developing,

a nuclear weapon. First objective. Beyond that, is the

objective not only to prevent Iran from having nuclear weapons,

but also to stop Teheran from having intercontinental ballistic missiles

—which would clearly escalate the existing threat by enhancing Iran’s

military capabilities? That is a second possibility. Alternatively,

is the third objective simply the famous ‘regime change’,

in the mould of past American interventions —most notably

the 2003 invasion of Iraq? That essentially defines the

neoconservative approach. It’s an approach that has been

notably criticised by Donald Trump. This point is certainly worth

reiterating. In fact, it could be

all three at once. However,

I think it is essential, right from the outset as we set out our

arguments, to clarify this point and perhaps consider another possibility. I believe we must completely

challenge the assumption that the United States is

intervening in Iran to weaken

China’s crude oil supply. This is quite simply a line of

reasoning that is not only flawed, but also constitutes

a serious geostrategic misinterpretation. Why? Firstly, because the

ones who subscribe to this line of thinking often have a tendency to be

overly swayed by an initial figure, namely the figure for

Iran’s crude oil exports to China. And it is true that this figure is misleading

at first glance because, in percentage terms, China accounts for

over 80% of Iranian oil exports. But if we look closer at the

data—where precision is vital— what do we see? While oil represents 80% of Iranian exports,

it accounted for barely 11% of Chinese imports

in both 2024 and 2025. This reinforces a point

we emphasised in a previous session:

Saudi Arabia & Iran from Another Lens. As I noted then,

we must be wary of these figures;

focusing on a single metric leads to a fundamental misinterpretation

of the data and its underlying reality. I would add

two additional points to further substantiate

this approach. Firstly, let’s consider

that for China, substituting 11% of their imports

with Russian supplies deepens their alignment with Moscow,

which, in turn, further helps finance Russia’s war in Ukraine. Moreover, it is far from clear

how an deepening Russia-China alignment serves American interests. Finally, there is a third consideration: if the conflict persists,

China might be tempted —either openly or covertly—

to provide Iran with material support.

Through such an agreement, Beijing could

signal to Tehran that closing

the Strait of Hormuz would be ill-advised,

as it would not only disrupt Chinese imports but also

cripple Iran’s own capacity to export. In fact,

the geostrategic miscalculation is such that one may even argue that

it is in the Chinese interest to ensure that this war between

the USA and Iran drags on. We will have the opportunity

to expand on this point later. Having made that

clarification, we must now

consider a possibility that may be

less satisfying for the Iranian people: perhaps Washington

is not actually seeking regime change, but simply wants to

change its point of contact. Effectively,

this means that Washington is orchestrating what is essentially

a palace coup. What they are

really aiming for is a situation where

Iranian leaders will eventually say: OK,

we’ve had enough of this war. Perhaps we should change some of our

policies; we’ll drop the nuclear programme,

end ballistic missile development, and to remain in power, we’ll

perhaps even... change alliances’—Something we saw

very often during the Cold War. Alliances are inherently dynamic, evolving

as geopolitical interests shift. Ironically,

this means that we now find Iran more closely aligned

with the United States than with China

or Russia. And it is clear from

what I am saying that American objectives are manifold

and as international dynamics

take hold, they will drive shifts

that will inevitably depend on how

these events unfold. Rather than focusing on a single objective,

we should recognise that there are actually many objectives. The real challenge

lies in seeing how they interact in terms of context and

geopolitical dynamics, which will influence

the objectives. Yes. To fully understand how

this conflict is developing, we must consider

four distinct geopolitical logics.

As these patterns have recurred

throughout history —a process we established through

our scenario method— they allow us to identify

the major trends that are already beginning to emerge. First, there is a principle that

I find essential, yet it is rarely discussed. Regardless of the justification

put forward by a foreign army —even if the goal is

to bring democracy or freedom—

there is no example in geopolitical history where

a prolonged conflict does not eventually lead

the local population to view those forces as invaders

rather than liberators. I believe this is

a point of critical importance. Secondly,

there is no precedent in modern history for a war being won solely

through the use of air power. In fact, we

already demonstrated this point in a previous Rendez-Vous de la Géopolitique

session back in June 2025 on whether air power was enough

to secure victory. The answer is no. This is best summarised

by Liddell Hart’s incisive observation: you cannot take prisoners with a bomber flying

through the sky. Thirdly, I must emphasise a point

that warrants further attention: if the conflict is protracted, even if we

were to achieve the objective of weakening or dismantling the

Iranian regime, how would we manage the inevitable

centrifugal forces that would follow? Such forces are particularly likely

to manifest in Iran, where two groups stand out:

the Kurds and the Baluchis. It

would be a strategic error, in my view, to assume that Washington would

view such an outcome as desirable. We have touched on this point

several times before in various sessions,

and it is a recurring theme in our analysis. It is worth revisiting the concept

introduced by Zbigniew Brzezinski in The Grand Chessboard, published

in the 1990s. We could call it:

Geopolitical Anarchy; or even:

Strategic Vacuum. In chapter four, Brzezinski called

it: the Black Hole. Essentially, this would mean replacing

a region of relative stability. Such an outcome

is a realistic geopolitical risk: the implosion of a nation that is the world’s 18th

largest by area, with 90 million inhabitants, would plunge it

into instability. This would involve a multitude of peoples whose actions one can

legitimately understand, yet whose actions will inevitably bring

disorder to the region, one capable of triggering

a seismic shift with aftershocks extending into

the Middle East and Pakistan. Clearly, this instability

would derail Washington’s ambitions to achieve the objectives

mentioned previously. The fourth factor—which will have

the greatest influence on the course of events—

is the question of time: who controls the temporal dimension, and who

could gain the advantage with time? Certainly. Our next questions will

reveal that this is indeed a critical consideration. Indeed, this question of time sits at

the intersection of geopolitical logics and domestic affairs,

since the American public’s reaction will significantly impact the objectives

set by Washington. In this regard, what aspects

should be considered? There are two key indicators that

we must monitor throughout the entire duration

of the war. The first indicator is

the public approval ratings concerning the

US President’s decision. We can turn to the initial polling

—and we know how closely Americans monitor such data, don’t we, Olivier?— Initial polls indicate

that the level of support from the American people concerning this war

in Iran is 21%. I believe there are

two factors that can explain this figure.

First, it’s really low. Extremely low,

especially for the outset of a war; it indicates that

four out of five Americans opposed the

United States entering this war. Another point worth highlighting is

that qualitative data suggests that among

the specific segments of the population that supported

and voted for Donald Trump,

this level of opposition is even more pronounced. This stems from

Donald Trump’s repeated campaign emphasis that

—unlike his predecessors— he did not want to commit

the United States to "forever wars":

conflicts like the twenty-year war in Afghanistan that drag on indefinitely. This prospect

of protracted warfare leads me to

our second key indicator: How will the American public

react to casualties in the long term? We must be very careful with our assumptions here. While the

quantitative dimension is clearly significant, the emotional and

communicative impact is paramount. This brings us to

the legacy of the Vietnam War: what crippled the US position

there wasn't just the death toll, but the fact that the victims

were no longer faceless. We will return to this

in another session. As the names and stories of

the fallen emerge, they rapidly erode public approval ratings. A proliferation of such instances

would further destabilise an electorate already

hesitant to support this war. In this regard,

you may remember John F. Kennedy’s famous

quip: Defeat is an orphan, but victory has a hundred fathers. In other words,

for the US President, this war must be won. It is a point I made during

a past RDVG session, which, ironically,

took up a rather paradoxical question: Must one, paradoxically, be bold

to prevail in geopolitics? I invoked the Dukes of Burgundy

to highlight that, ultimately, the line between boldness and

recklessness is a fine one, and that history judges this distinction solely through

the prism of victory or defeat. This distinction will also

be a defining issue as this war unfolds. To determine whether strategic objectives

are achievable, we must weigh them against the resources made available

to achieve the objectives. This leads me to consider the current

state of United States military deployment. How should we assess it today? There are four characteristics,

or four aspects if you like, which I believe to be essential

to raise or highlight for our audience, even if it means returning

later to see how these characteristics or elements will evolve. The first, obviously,

is the question of ammunition. This is hardly a trivial matter. In just

a few days, we’ve already seen a massive burn rate

of ammunition. The question that

naturally arises is: how long can the US, in particular,

keep up this breakneck pace of

firing cruise missiles and dropping laser-guided and conventional bombs? To grasp the full scale of this

issue, I feel it would obviously be too tedious to list

every single statistic. Besides, it wouldn’t make much sense. But at the very least, I feel it is

essential to give an example so that we can better and more accurately gauge the

significance of the factor currently under consideration. Let’s take the famous Tomahawk

missiles as an example. According to US military data,

over 100 Tomahawk cruise missiles

were expended within the first five days of the conflict.

One hundred Tomahawk missiles is a particularly significant figure, since it

effectively exceeds the total annual

US production capacity. In fact,

the initial 2026 forecast procurement

plan only called for the production of 57 Tomahawks

for the whole of 2026. All this evidence is clear:

within four or five days, the military went through

the equivalent of a full year’s production. Furthermore, it is important

to remember that a Tomahawk missile can take nearly two years to manufacture. As for the Patriot

missile, looking at this from a defensive

perspective, we must focus on factors other than cost, because it is

clear that, far more than the cost, it is the quantity that

can be produced and the time required to produce them that will be

the decisive variable. For a defensive weapon like the Patriot, we’re

looking at a two-to-three-year production time. There is

a further development that reinforces

this point: the US Central Command

(CENTCOM) has begun explicitly showcasing imagery

of Rockwell B-1 and the famous B-52 bombers

in the region. Some of you might be wondering why

this detail is important. The reason is that these are

heavy strategic bombers designed for

massive payloads. Their deployment implies

two things: one, that the airstrike campaign has a long way to go

before objectives are met, and two, the sheer volume

of ammunition required to keep them

in the air. That’s the first point. The second is something

we rarely hear about, which is just as thought-provoking:

the operational readiness of the pilots. If we examine the figures for

fighter aircraft —excluding support assets

such as tankers, transport,

reconnaissance, counter-warfare, electronic platforms, etc.— and if we calculate the ratio between the

number of these fighter aircraft and the missions already concluded,

what would we reveal? That most US pilots are already being required

to carry out practically three sorties a day. That is enormous. It means that if the war is

of medium duration, they would need

a very high level of rotation to ensure continuity. I will set aside the hypothetical

scenario of casualties among these American pilots, which

would inevitably exacerbate tensions regarding this issue. There is a third point, however, that

I feel is essential to highlight. If we look closely at

the dramatic events of 8 and 9 January 2026

—which we should not forget; as I even feel compelled to remind

some observers that they are events of profound significance

in the history of geopolitics, given the

scale of human losses— how long did it take the Americans to

assemble the resources they deemed necessary? Because operations

did not begin until 28 February. So, this means that, regardless of

the size and actual power attributed to the US military—and I emphasise ‘actual’—

the fact remains that if we look closely at the timeline outlined here,

it took the Americans at least 5 to 6 weeks to assemble their resources. This poses a question

regarding the operational readiness of

American aircraft carriers. Olivier, we also recorded a RDVG

session on the characteristics of these aircraft carriers. During that session,

it was easy to see that the USA is,

by far, the world’s leading naval aviation power,

with eleven aircraft carriers in its fleet. This raises an

immediate question: where are those 11

US aircraft carriers? As previously mentioned,

only two are currently operational —among them, the Gerald R. Ford

in the Mediterranean. This brings us to

a significant realisation. The fact is, some of them are not

currently deployable because they are undergoing refit,

refurbishment, repairs, or resupply. What’s more, other parts of the world

should also be taken into account, which brings me to a fourth point: we should never forget that

it is impossible to wage a war —or even remain vigilant against tensions—

on two fronts simultaneously, even for the US military today. We previously addressed

this limitation during our two sessions assessing the

post-withdrawal conflicts in Afghanistan. I previously highlighted that

the United States, already engaged in Afghanistan

by late 2001 (December 2001), launched an ambitious operation

in Iraq in March 2003. By the 2009–2010

Obama administration, the US was facing

a very delicate situation requiring hard trade-offs regarding priority sectors. I’ll illustrate this with an analogy that may

come as a surprise: it was the terrifying context

that the German General Staff faced during the First World War,

as it had to divide its forces between the Eastern and Western Fronts

—an operational nightmare. Which means, of course, that

what is happening in Iran has consequences in other parts of the world. Let’s broaden our perspective. How can we not think of the Pacific? We have touched on this in relation

to the oil issue, but we are looking at China, and they, in turn, are watching what is

happening in Iran and this US deployment. There are inevitably

geopolitical repercussions for China, affecting its view of geopolitics

and its future course of action. So, in reality, the answer on this

particular question is quite clear: the primary impact of the war launched by

the United States in Iran will be to bring the Taiwan factor

even more prominently to the fore in the Pacific. And to put it plainly,

a strategic window of opportunity is opening up for China. Given everything I have said previously

regarding American society and the resources

required by the US military, it is clear that

the United States will not be able to be as influential or as present in the face

of the challenge that China might pose, whatever that challenge may be

—particularly in Taiwan. Which means, let us be clear,

that US involvement in Iran was indeed the point I was implying in

my previous question when I said: one might even think

that the Chinese have an interest in this war dragging on. Clearly, with the US

preoccupied by the war in Iran on one front and—let’s not forget—still needing to

monitor the ongoing war between Ukraine and Russia

on the other, Beijing may feel emboldened to take

more daring, or even overtly military,

actions in the Pacific. The assertion

that Iran stands alone is technically accurate

regarding formal alliances —akin to the Triple Entente

or Triple Alliance of 1914. There exists no

automatic mutual defence pact between

Iran, Russia, and China that would compel

Chinese intervention. That’s not where the danger is. Firstly, while Russia

is certainly relieved to see American attention shifting

elsewhere, it is forced to focus all its resources on the war it has been

waging against Ukraine since 24 February 2022. China, however, is better

positioned to supply radar systems

and anti-aircraft batteries, which allows it not only

to support Iran more or less openly, but also to test its

equipment to see how effective it is against American weaponry. This warrants close attention, even without

direct front line engagement. Clearly,

the war between Iran, the USA, and Israel has repercussions

across all the questions we have just raised. These are matters of

major significance, unfolding within an international context that is,

as we have seen elsewhere, already dense

—if not volatile. At this stage, do these geostrategic questions

help us to even begin formulating a geopolitical answer? There are at least

three readily at hand. Our aim is to underscore the importance of these issues

and draw your attention to them so that we may continue

to monitor their development, as we are, as always,

focused on the long term. Conversely, three clear answers

to them have already emerged from this war, barely six days

after its outbreak. The first, ironically, is the risk

of nuclear proliferation. It may seem incredible

—and frankly shocking— but current events are actually

proving North Korea right. Ultimately,

from an objective and rational standpoint, the most effective deterrent against

any sort of external intervention,

is having your own nuclear arsenal. Furthermore, for the sake of

remaining objective, it is also worth noting that the

March 2003 US intervention surely reinforced the Iranian regime’s belief that

they needed a nuclear arsenal to avoid exactly

what they have been facing over the past six days. Therefore, the assertion that this will

diminish the influence of nuclear weapons seems ambitious, if not

fundamentally flawed; since I have the impression that we’re heading

in the opposite direction. A second response that has

certainly been reinforced concerns the idea that the concept of the West as a monolithic entity has

effectively dissolved. We have development, which we have

previously analysed this in several sessions—most notably in

our assessment of Donald Trump. I should also highlight the

US strategic document published last 8 December.

It is telling that the first chapter covers the

Western Hemisphere yet excludes Europe entirely. This distinction

was so pronounced that

a separate chapter was dedicated to Europe, proving that,

in the American view, these represent

two fundamentally different spheres. Furthermore,

it should be noted that the French

aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle was forced to

turn back while docked in Malmö, near Sweden, and

not far from the Baltic. This suggests that Washington,

in preparing the operation, deliberately avoided

informing their allies—if they can still be termed as

such—including the French. This leads to a third point: Europe is currently floundering,

appearing more fragmented than ever. Admittedly, one could argue —with a degree of

strategic objectivity— that the Italian government’s

decision to bolster the air defences of certain Gulf monarchies

serves a specific purpose. By providing the necessary equipment for these objectives, Rome is taking

an active role while remaining firmly within a

defensive and restrained framework. I must emphasise that it

is a defensive approach. Conversely,

how should we view those European governments

that appear to use international law as a convenient

smokescreen to mask a lack of

strategic vision —or perhaps

even outright cowardice? These governments should be

reminded of a simple fact: while they may pride themselves on

upholding international law, Iran is hardly a model of compliance when it comes to

international law, particularly regarding its nuclear aspirations. Secondly, we should remind these

governments that they are often the the very same

people who, only thirty years ago,

championed the 'right to intervene'.

It was then considered a magnificent principle:

the idea that there was a duty

—not merely an option— to intervene against a government

that is ostensibly oppressing and destroying its own people, even outside the strictures

of international law. We saw this clearly during the wars in the

former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. In response to this, I must admit that

I would be quite inclined to offer some advice. I think it they would benefit from

reading Jean Anouilh’s drama: Antigone. Antigone might help them realise that

something stands higher than law: justice. Isn’t it wonderful to

point out, in this conclusion to today’s Rendez-Vous de la Géopolitique,

that in reality, it is geopolitics... though it may be more accurate to say:

it is realpolitik, with its strength and power,

that serves justice far better than international law. Fabrice, I suggest we stop here

with this conclusion. Thanks.

Thank you. That wraps up this session of

Rendez-Vous de la Géopolitique. Thank you all

for following us.