Trump : Quel 1er bilan géopolitique ?

A geopolitical assessment for Trump? With Donald Trump now

a year into his second term, this inquiry is both

unavoidable and essential. Why unavoidable? Because US initiatives are

multiplying in variety and complexity, necessitating renewed scrutiny. This assessment is vital to distinguish

the Trump administration’s underlying strategy

and structural objectives. Ultimately, it enables us to understand

the specific geopolitical influences this action exerts on the world. Fabrice Ravel, hello. Hello, Olivier.

Hello everyone. I misspoke. I said ‘this action’, not ‘these actions’; and

there have been countless actions since the beginning of Trump's mandate. That's the least we can say. I will take this a step further and

outline the primary developments. It will become evident that

there has been a significant flurry of

activity from the Trump administration

between 20 January 2025 and January 2026,

and he has only been in office since he was sworn in

on 20 January 2025. Indeed, I have identified nine

key events to report, which I will summarise briefly

so we can be in a better position to respond to the question

regarding an initial assessment. However, we must first establish a clear

record of the specific actions taken. To begin with, both chronologically

and in terms of importance for Trump,

we had a re-engagement with Vladimir Putin

and Russian diplomacy. This has become

a common thread. We could even refine that

by describing it as a recurrent theme throughout the year—playing out almost like

a serialised drama or soap opera— marked by a relentless

cycle of encounters, break-ups or ruptures,

and then the inevitable comebacks. In the wake of those initial overtures,

Donald Trump used a huge chart in early April 2025 to

delineate what he characterised as a landscape of global trade imbalances and

excessive foreign customs duties foreign customs duties that left the USA on

the losing side of the global ledger. Six days later,

Donald Trump granted a 90-day moratorium. By August, however, these duties were formally

imposed on several countries, while the moratorium

was extended for others. This sequence demonstrates

a dynamic, proactive approach that necessitates careful

interpretation of subsequent developments. Trump would later use his

social media platform on 10 May 2025 to claim a pivotal role in

brokering a ceasefire between India and Pakistan. This long-standing bilateral tension

was a subject we previously examined,

specifically regarding whether the crisis would escalate into

open conflict or subside. Subsequently, on the night of 21 June 2025,

several Iranian nuclear facilities were targeted and bombed

by B-2 stealth bombers. That was already

number four which brings us to the fifth major intervention: the facilitated

peace process between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. An initial treaty was signed in late

June, which was subsequently formalised and extended by the Washington Agreements of

5 December, drawn up to seek long-term diplomatic continuity. In late September 2025,

the Gaza Strip Treaty—also known as the Trump Plan—

was reportedly signed. While this highlights

a series of apparent peace initiatives, it is significant that

on 20 December 2025, Trump ordered US military strikes on

Islamic State bases in Syria.

This was followed up by the launch on Christmas Day (25 December)

of twelve Tomahawk missiles targeting Islamic State bases

in north-western Nigeria. Finally, on 3 January 2026,

the Venezuelan president was captured. Another common

thread is Trump’s interest in Greenland, evinced through Donald Trump Jr's

visit in January 2025 before his father’s inauguration. We can see a persistent demand,

if not direct pressure—the audience may choose the term they find

most appropriate— exerted on

both Canada and Greenland. We can clearly see a

sort of frenzy that requires careful interpretation, because

we’re looking at multifaceted actions involving multiple actors spanning

different global regions. The scope of these actions encompasses

virtually every continent. Moreover, a strategic oscillation is evident between

diplomatic attempts to broker peace and overt

military operations seeking decisive victory

through armed conflict or war. This is where I think we would need

interpretation to accurately evaluate

these actions. Yes, since the sheer volume and geographical

diversity of interventions —coupled with their varying

modalities—make it difficult to discern any coherence. To gain clarity, specific

analytical criteria should be applied. I suggest a first step entailing

an examination of the tangible results of these American initiatives. And then, perhaps, a second step to

link these actions to the objectives set out by the Trump administration. Let’s thus begin with

the results. We should first seek to objectively assess

what the results of the actions taken

might be. From a methodological perspective,

we should maintain a rather natural, yet essential

distinction. Yet how can we assess these

short- and long-term results? As we shall see,

diplomatically and militarily, our

assessment must be nuanced according to the timeframe,

particularly when examining results from a short-term or

a long-term perspective. Beginning with the

short-term results, the immediate impression is that

—I’ll insist on this—we can objectively point to the sentiment of

multiple victories on many fronts. First, diplomatically;

since we can conclude that the Trump administration

endeavoured to secure, if not peace, at least a ceasefire and

end to hostilities in three pivotal geopolitical

theatres, namely the India-Pakistan conflict, the dispute between Rwanda and

the Democratic Republic of Congo, and then the Middle East, following

the implementation of a peace plan for the Gaza Strip. On the military front,

the successes were equally substantial. These operations

can be categorised by their increasing

operational complexity. The missile strikes conducted

in Nigeria were undoubtedly effective; however,

the air campaigns in Syria and the sophisticated strikes against

Iranian nuclear infrastructure represent a higher echelon

of coordination. The latter, in particular,

demonstrated precise coordination between bombers and tactical air forces. Finally, if one focuses strictly on

the operational dimensions of the recent intervention in Venezuela,

it is clear that we are observing a successful joint

military engagement. This required a seamless

integration of aerial strikes, the tactical deployment of

ground troops—which is, after all, a wholly different undertaking— and a capacity for the projection and

withdrawal of supporting naval forces. From that vantage point,

it was clearly successful. However, if we examine these

events from a longer-term perspective, we can legitimately question the results

that have been achieved. I must also point out that shifting

from the short term to the long term is, ultimately, a shift from the

tactical to the strategic dimension. This point warrants elaboration,

as it necessitates a reassessment of the apparent

initial impact of these actions. We will inevitably encounter

a pendulum swing, as both diplomatic and military consequences

require a longer horizon

to fully appreciate the scope of these actions. Firstly, from a diplomatic

viewpoint, it must be observed that

while the aforementioned events include ceasefires and truces, fundamental

geopolitical tensions remain unresolved. The long-standing rivalry

between India and Pakistan remains at an impasse. We might add that with regard to

Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo,

it took exhaustive American diplomatic pressure to get the Washington agreements

signed on 5 December, and they faced multiple delays because

the fighting had not really stopped. Moreover, fighting between

Rwanda and the DRC has not only persisted but has

seemingly intensified since the signing. We may thus get the impression that we’re

sadly continuing in the same vein as all the regional peace deals that had

failed previously. As for the situation in the Middle East,

while an initial phase was clearly signed on 9 October in Egypt between Israel and

several Palestinian authorities, we remain a long way from a definitive peace.

Tensions remain critically high. Even at this stage, we must

be cautious; militarily, the current results may represent

temporary tactical successes, but they have

failed to resolve the underlying

structural issues. I haven’t even delved into the sporadic

strikes mentioned in Syria or Nigeria. However, I would like to emphasise what

happened in Iran, since we did record a session earlier on Iran addressing

whether air power would be enough

to secure victory. If you recall, Olivier, we emphasised

that it was not about securing victory, rather it concerned the ability to buy time and

delay Iran's research into or acquisition of nuclear weapons. That matter needed to be

completely nuanced. I think two additional points

should also be added. Firstly,

if we consider all the measures taken on customs agreements

or customs tariffs, it is important to note that the effects

of such measures can only be assessed over a much longer

period of time. While we are sure to unpack

this further in some future RDVG session, it is worth noting

a shift in relations with China; specifically,

since after meeting Xi Jinping, Donald Trump has

substantially walked back the scale of

the customs duties he had

originally proposed. This observation carries

even more weight when we acknowledge that China was the specific target

of these measures. It is clear, however, that the

initial expectations may not yield results as substantive as

we might have first assumed. I’ll round off

our analysis and return to the final item on our initial list

by suggesting that if there is one area where

the situation remains notably static, it’s the ongoing war between Ukraine and Russia. Ultimately, a clear

assessment here may be a complex challenge. To maintain an objective

perspective on these results, we may need to look toward different methodological

lenses to fully understand the current landscape. Perhaps, to put these results into proper

perspective, we should pivot our analysis towards the administration's own stated goals:

what was Donald Trump seeking to achieve? There are three key elements

to consider, since the outcomes of these policies acquire

deeper meaning when viewed through the lens of the original goals

sought by Trump and his administration. What are these three elements? We can start with JD Vance's speech

at the Munich Security

Conference on 14 February 2025. Then there is a particularly

important document finalised in November 2025

and published on 5 December 2025. Which document? This document, which outlines Washington’s

National Security Strategy, is of clear and significant importance.

While we will return to its specifics later, it is worth noting that several pages

comprehensively define these goals. There is a third element which aligns

with this: a development from 8 December 2025. It could serve as a live commentary

for those who may have overlooked the original document: I’m talking about a special

session of the Politico programme known as "The Conversation”,

during which a journalist interviewed

Donald Trump for over

forty minutes. Of these three elements,

the document on strategic analysis is our primary interest. We will be placing this text

at the forefront of our discussion, since it contains

a range of aspects that will very quickly clarify the broader trajectory. So let’s dive right into

this document, shall we? When examining the regional breakdown,

the Western Hemisphere emerges as the first major

area of concern, as it is highlighted over 4 full pages. We must consider what the

Western Hemisphere actually encompasses and implies

within these pages. As you’ll notice, the

Western Hemisphere is largely Latin America. It is significant to observe

that within the periodic framework of the US National Security

Strategy, this edition marks the first time

Latin America has been accorded such high strategic priority. That is something

definitely worth highlighting. The second region is Asia, but more

specifically, Asia-Pacific, which receives about four pages

of attention. Predictably, the document

maintains strategic continuity by designating China as a systemic competitor;

and also outlines a roll-back policy

that relies heavily on integrated alliances

such as the Quad and AUKUS. We covered these alliances in

a previous session of RDVG. The third region addressed is Europe,

a section characterised by a certain

strategic ambivalence; while Washington

affirms the region’s importance,

it simultaneously insists that European partners

must assume a greater share of

the collective defence burden. Significantly, Russia is situated within this

European context on page 25, framing the security imperative for the continent. Russia is denied a specific

regional status, portrayed instead as a weakened actor

whose primary role in US diplomacy

is to catalyse a more

self-sufficient Europe, capable of dealing with Russia, and thus managing its own

risks and major dichotomies. This approach aims to insulate American assets

from continental risks, ensuring that focus remains fixed on

the systemic rivalry with China. I think that's very important. We can now clearly how

the document’s regional sequencing illustrates the strategic shift

we are currently examining. The Near and Middle East

occupy only a marginal fourth-place position over two pages,

while Africa is only cited in 3 paragraphs on the final page.

Crucially, the policy regarding Africa has

pivoted from development and liberal reform to

the targeted investment in

—and I quote— “Africa’s tremendous natural resources”. We can thus sense

a number of major trends coming to light,

which we may be able to perceive better if we try to synthesise them

in a global geostrategic framework. The logic

being applied here is quite clear, but can we discern

an underlying philosophy behind Trump and his administration? Certainly. A cohesive philosophy emerges

and becomes apparent when we consider

two specific references that are also highlighted

in the document mentioned earlier. What do these references entail? The first is clearly the Monroe Doctrine. It is analytically significant to revisit

a speech given by the 5th US President, James Monroe, on 2 December 1823 We must exercise caution here, as there is a

frequent tendency to caricature it or reduce it to isolationism. That represents only one

facet of the policy. From a different perspective, we can see

the implementation of the phrase America for the Americans.

Properly interpreted, it envisions the American continent as a whole, with the

United States of North America as the only power entitled to exercise

legitimate and natural hegemony. What's more—and this is clearly

articulated in the document— the United States

now denies any other power the opportunity to

exert influence within this hemisphere. Should they do so, the

US would be compelled to intervene. This point bears

significant consequences. Indeed, the text clarifies that

Donald Trump is implementing this doctrine, which is termed the Trump corollary

to the Monroe Doctrine. There is clearly

a return to the strategic pursuit of a privileged sphere of influence. Some geopolitical experts seem to

dispute this logic. I would invite them to reread the document. Again, we should read the documents. It is clear that

the United States is asserting a distinct logic of influence. As we conclude our session, we

shouldn’t forget to point out that this will inevitably have

geopolitical consequences, more broadly, on the rest of the world. That wraps up the first reference, which objectively brings us to a second

reference: Ronald Reagan. Ronald Reagan's approach is

defined by the maxim: ‘Peace through strength’, a hallmark of Ronald Reagan. When we consider his first term

(1980–1984) and, subsequently, again during his second term

(1985–1988), there was a considerable increase in the American military budget.

He embarked on an arms race with the specific intent of significantly

slowing down Soviet production and compelling them to

negotiate, thereby achieving peace through strength. I think it is essential to remember

a third US president, who is perhaps

less prominently featured in the document. He is not

necessarily cited as often as the first two by Donald Trump himself,

and many observers tend to forget him.

Yet I believe it is essential to recall him in the context of

our discussion. I’m talking about US President

Theodore Roosevelt, known for his Big Stick theory. It is worth remembering that

Theodore Roosevelt oversaw a pivotal shift from the end

of the 19th century into the beginning of the 20th.

His idea was essentially: If I’m looking to achieve

an international goal, I show up with a big stick. This is the famous Big Stick theory,

which is applied with even greater emphasis when talking with allies. I think this is an

interesting point to highlight. To advance our analysis,

I believe we must consider three conceptual references, keeping

three analyses in mind. I believe that they

will allow us to definitively interpret

the US administration's current objectives. This will enable

a more nuanced appreciation of the outcomes. Primarily, if we refer to

Emmanuel Todd’s After the Empire,

we can discern the logic of the Delian League

at play. In After the Empire, we see a comparison between Athens and

the United States of America. We can clearly see a power

asserting its supremacy and hegemony first and foremost over its allies, where it is

the allies who must pay for their security. That’s the Delian League. Contributions were made to

the treasury deposited at Delos to build up the Athenian fleet

and military power; in return, Athens provided security through

its fleet and army. It is clear that

this was Emmanuel Todd’s central thesis, evoking a specific image

of the world as viewed by Trump and NATO officials who argue that

European contributions to the collective budget—to the NATO budget—

are inadequate. I think this is the first thing

we must bear in mind. It leads us directly to

Paul Kennedy’s book, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. His argument seeks

to determine whether, timelessly and across civilisations,

a universal logic governs how a state rises to power,

reaches its zenith, and then falls into decline. Why would I bring up

his book in this context? Because Paul Kennedy emphasises and

demonstrates that when a power shifts

from macroeconomic strength and political power to excessive

military power, it becomes exhausted. Moreover,

following on from Paul Kennedy's reasoning, I feel there is one point

rarely emphasised that warrants our attention. While most observers focus on

the specific percentages of customs duties and their impact

on the different trade relations, the true interest lies elsewhere. In this logic of

customs duties, we can see a tremendous admission. Let’s consider it this way:

could this need or urgent rush to impose customs duties

actually reveal what may be an impression

of perceived difficulty or economic weakness? If we compare this with

American history, I think it would that

we would easily see that the United States

of the 1950s or 1960s never feared economic competition

or felt the need to set up customs barriers to protect itself against

economic powers that seemed to threaten its growth. On the contrary, we should remember

that after 1945, Washington

actually encouraged French and British decolonisation to open up markets that

had been closed by colonial tariffs. Back then,

the United States was confident in its ability to dominate

any open market. This focus on

customs barriers suggests something quite interesting. In Paul Kennedy's view,

this expansive display of power functions as a paradox;

rather than signalling absolute strength,

it underscores a profound anxiety regarding

national decline. This distinction is vital

for our reflection. Finally,

as a third element, we should note that

by doing so, the United States adopted a global role

it had never held since its birth on 4 July 1776. In fact, a closer look reveals

that the United States has always

played—or at least asserted— a singular role

in the international order, driven by various, shifting

reasons. Gérard Chaliand and Arnaud

Blin underscore this in America is Back: Les Nouveaux

Césars du Pentagone (in French). I’m thinking of page 99 in

particular; the title of chapter four. Translated literally,

it’s Woodrow Wilson's catechism. The term catechism is quite

interesting, because we can clearly see that there was a claim

to have brought a unique message, to be a unique player,

rightly or wrongly, a claim to be the defender

of democracy and freedom, and therefore to be a very special player

in international relations. Yet there is nothing of the sort in

the document we are discussing. It contains no intent to

convey a political message. We are thus witnessing the banalisation

of the United States. We’re looking at an actor that suddenly

eschews the mantle of classic player in international relations, and is

now defending its interests and exerting influence like the various powers

of the past, or indeed, its contemporary

rivals in this third decade of the 21st century. This may not be the least of

the paradoxes we could examine, but there is another, perhaps more

vital and unexpected, that warrants

our attention. You identified another, albeit still

unexplained paradox that could potentially affect the Trump administration’s

record by the second term’s end. What exactly is this paradox? Donald Trump,

through the actions we have examined, seems

to be perfectly in tune with this world of geopolitical power relations. But there’s a “but”. Upon closer examination,

Donald Trump's actions appear to be based almost exclusively on a macroeconomic logic. We could revisit the events previously

mentioned—and particularly his speeches and verbal explanations—

to find that his focus remains nearly

entirely confined to this specific line of reasoning. I will provide a few examples

to further illustrate this point. It was quite striking, in

the aftermath of the strike on Iran, to hear the U.S. President explain to

journalists aboard Air Force One that Iran

should abandon its nuclear ambitions

since the country would be far better served by focusing

on commercial operations. Furthermore, the Iranians are remarkable

business people with a potential for extraordinary development on commercial logic. In a similar vein,

when the Washington Accords were signed on 5 December 2025,

it was equally startling to observe Donald Trump—

offering hearty pats on the back to the representatives of

Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo—declaring: You'll see, we're all going to make

a lot of money. It's true that this is quite

out of step with the outlook. However, I think another example

will take us even further, because when, at the end of June, he

welcomed NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte in his office and discussed relations

between Israel and Iran in a rather condescending manner on the one hand, but

above all in a rather offbeat manner on the other, he compared Iran and Israel to

schoolchildren fighting in playground who need to be separated. But what we are saying here is

much more important than it might seem. This reveals a fundamental

misunderstanding of geopolitical logic,

which is here reduced strictly to

a macroeconomic dimension and the pursuit of profit. While the administration may grasp

the balance of power, it fails to recognise that ideological principles

and national interests often transcend macroeconomic concerns

when dealing with geopolitics. This

oversight frequently leads Trump and his advisors to misjudge

the evolution of certain situations. I am thinking specifically of the war between

Ukraine and Russia—a conflict that in the eyes of Vladimir Putin

and the Russian leadership, clearly cannot be reduced to a simple

macroeconomic perspective. This distinction is vital; while the Trump

administration may appear synchronised with the

geopolitical reality, it lacks the substantive political framework

or interpretation mentioned in America is Back: Les Nouveaux Césars du Pentagone

(The New Caesars of the Pentagon). It is entirely possible that the future of the

USA will necessitate a reintroduction of this political framework. There will therefore be a return to a

Wilsonian perspective, or confirmation of

a radically different perspective, such as that espoused by

Vice-President J D Vance. However, there have already

been major consequences at the global geopolitical level. Even before future events unfold, we are

witnessing consequences that affect the Trump administration, the USA,

and its broader sphere of influence, reaching across the globe. First, yes,

and this last word is significant, as it emphasises that we’re still in the

realm of hypothesis rather than certainty. If the West still exists, what

does it entail? That is a real question. Earlier, we examined how

geography per se represents a significant issue in the mind of

the American administration. However, we can also see that this question

arises even more acutely within the specific relationship between the USA and Europe. We might further extend

this inquiry by asking if the future belongs to the American

ambition to change European policy—aligning it with

their own vision of what allies should be—

or if the Europeans will successfully wait for new US elections

to restore the previous nature of the relationship. This dynamic reveals a primary

consequence of significant weight. Yet there is also a secondary one. This is the final nail in the coffin. It’s the final nail in the coffin

for international law. We are now faced with the question of

how to leverage law to oppose Russia and deny Moscow the possibility

of expanding their territory? Similarly, we must ask

how we can expect to hold China to international law regarding its

ambitions in Taiwan, especially given Washington’s actions

over the last twelve months— most notably in Venezuela. We are clearly in a period of immense

upheaval, which many interpret as a return to realpolitik. I don’t believe it. Realpolitik has always been present. And so, in fact, it is a wake-up call for

Westerners, and particularly for Europeans, who have so often clung to

this dream of eternal peace, not to say perpetual peace.

Europeans will have to relearn how to live alone. But to live alone in geopolitics, they must

relearn how to see themselves as a power. To be a power or not to be. To paraphrase Shakespeare in Scene 1

of Act 3 of Hamlet: Prince of Denmark, which turns

the matter back to Greenland. This is the response Europeans

must now formulate. But can they manage to ask

themselves the question? Regardless, Fabrice, thank you for guiding us

towards this reflection on the connection between solitude and power,

which I find particularly fruitful. And I hope you all can join us again very

soon for another session of Rendez-Vous de la Géopolitique.

Thanks Thank you. Thank you all for following

this new session of Rendez-vous de la Géopolitique.

See you soon!