Ukraine-Russie. Où en est-on ?

Russia-Ukraine: Where do things stand? As the war grinds on, the initial blaze

of global interest has flickered into a dull ember compared

to its initial peak. There are many sources of distraction:

conflicts in the Near and Middle East, areas of tension,

whether in Greenland or American interventions in Venezuela. There are many sources

of conflict and war. However,

Ukraine and Russia are and will remain pivotal in global geopolitical

developments. That is why we are going to revisit

this issue today with Fabrice Ravel. Hello, Fabrice.

Hello, Olivier. Hello, everyone. I’ve just hinted that the

conflict seems to be commonplace. It’s been going on for a long time. We are already entering a fifth year. Can we ask ourselves today

where things stand with this conflict? I have deliberately highlighted

this expression to emphasise that the conflict has

not only become a routine fixture

of the landscape but is also being perceived

as less significant. Such a decline in urgency would have been

considered unthinkable or even impossible in

2024, only two years into the hostilities, when

global attention was entirely and appropriately

absorbed by the crisis. I believe there are two primary

factors behind this shift. Firstly, 2025 was an

exceptionally dense year. Specifically, we must consider the intensifying

conflicts and frictions in the Middle East, escalating tensions over Greenland, and Washington’s recent

interventions in Venezuela. It is evident that the

initiatives led by Donald Trump —as explored in our

previous session, ‘Trump: an initial assessment’—

have consistently captivated both the media

and high-level decision-makers. That’s the first explanation. Yet this is also

reinforced by a secondary factor that we must also consider.

What’s that? It’s a pervasive, almost unsettling perception

that the conflict has reached a standstill, despite

the ongoing reality of profound human loss

and physical devastation. The word ‘frozen’ stands out to us

because it feels as if the entire situation has stopped moving. Moreover, to elaborate on

this term, I should point out that it is the same one

I used in late February 2024. As we are recording this in

February 2026, we should be clear on that consistency. So, two years ago,

after two years of conflict, the front line had already

become frozen. This suggests that as we add another two years

(24 months) to the ledger, shifting our gaze to the long term,

we get the impression that the clock has stopped. How can we avoid the parallel to

the German novelist Erich Maria Remarque and his 1929 work, All Quiet

on the Western Front? If we transpose that sentiment to

Eastern Europe today, could we also ask whether it has truly become all quiet

on the Eastern front? There is an impression of a gnawing

on a map, with a few scraps of land nibbled away here and there. We might recall a caricature from

a French satirical newspaper during the First World War, depicting an

French officer rejoicing as he claims to be ‘nibbling away’

at the German officers. The caption in this satirical newspaper

is: Yes, like a mouse

attacking a safe. To put it bluntly,

if this is really the case, then we are facing a situation that

looks set to continue for a very long time. However, I think our inquiry is

still very important. Firstly, because

we have had four years of war with significant events,

destruction, and staggering losses

—but also because we cannot fail to notice

the developing challenges and consequences that, beyond the

the conflict per se, have global and geopolitical

repercussions. That is why this question cannot be ignored. Yet even if it appears frozen, a closer look

reveals that the situation was shifting during this

fourth year of conflict. Perhaps we should

take stock of this year. Yes, perhaps starting with the most

positive aspects, if you don't mind,

especially since they are the most recent at the time of

preparing this session. I think our audience senses the weight of this

milestone: four years of conflict since 24 February 2022, and we unfortunately

find ourselves stepping into the shadow of

a fifth year of war. What is this first positive event? We are observing a shift towards

more frequent and seemingly more

serious negotiations. First, towards the end of 2025,

there were several meetings in Moscow. Crucially, the

summit set for late February 2026 in Abu Dhabi is particularly compelling,

as it marks the first instance of a trilateral engagement since

2022, this time between the Ukrainians, the Russians, and

the United States. It will be the first time that all three

will be meeting at the same time. Of particular interest within the Russian

delegation is General Igor Kostyukov; as the head of Russian military intelligence

for the army, his presence brings the full weight of the GRU

to these proceedings. The presence of such

a heavyweight Russian figure signals that the players

may finally be putting their cards on the table,

raising the stakes and—optimistically— the chances of

a breakthrough. On the other hand, there are

clearly a number of sticking points. Reflecting on 2025,

the first thought that arises is the likelihood of

severe stumbling blocks regarding territory, especially as

Russia continues to claim the Donbas in its entirety. I think that we should explain the

situation to our audience, clarifying that the Donbas was an integral part of

Ukraine prior to the 24 February 2022 invasion.

Currently, Ukrainian forces maintain control of

20% of the region; by fortifying the cities of Kramatorsk

and Sloviansk into significant military bastions, they have created

a defensive line that the Russian military has thus far been

unable to breach. While this stumbling block is

clearly a significant hurdle, it also necessitates a shift

in our analytical focus. This transition will allow us

to shift our perspectives to other issues

that we will also examine during this session. In this regard, I should make

a brief summary of what happened. Overall, between

late February 2025 and February 2026, the Ukrainians are convinced that

the Russians cannot sustain their current pace and that the situation

is becoming untenable for the Russians. Kyiv anchors its confidence in a

series of indicators that support this perspective. First, to answer your question:

throughout the summer of 2025, Ukraine notably

ramped up its long-range strikes. It is estimated that between July and

late September/early October 2025, the Ukrainians carried out

no fewer than 58 attacks on Russian territory. These strikes comprised

drones and missiles that pierced the Russian heartland at ranges

exceeding 2,000 kilometres. Crucially—and I will expand on this later—

Ukraine also relies on the scale of Russian losses

to support this view. Despite the

immense difficulties in gathering information,

data suggests a staggering

toll: in 2025 alone, the Russian military machine appears

to have bled out the equivalent of 350,000 men through death, injury,

or missing in action. This means, Olivier,

that in 2025—just one year of the four-year conflict—Russia incurred nearly

a third of all its casualties since the war began. That’s the second point. The Ukrainians believe the war

will become unsustainable for Russia because the rate of casualties

they are inflicting cannot be maintained

in the long term. What I find interesting as

a third point is the Ukrainian goal of

making the war a tangible reality for the Russian people. There are two key elements

to consider in this regard, and both are central to what we should

keep in mind for 2025. First, three senior officers were killed

in attacks in Russia in 2025. I should add that the Ukrainians

still refuse to admit they were behind

these attacks. Ultimately, the air remains thick with

an almost unbearable suspense over who is truly

responsible for the attacks. Another notable

operation is Spiderweb, which the Ukrainians launched

on 1 June 2025. Operation Spiderweb involved

drone attacks on multiple sites, though the drones

were first transported in lorries to bring them closer

to their targets. This impressive, highly coordinated operation

struck multiple targets simultaneously. Using missiles or drones,

it targeted Russian strategic bombers. Ukraine claims

40 were destroyed, though Western observers

estimate the number at 20. It is clear the aim was to convey the

message that Ukraine is still there, capable of striking

deeper into Russian territory —including strategic targets—

to make the cost of the war more tangible

for the Russian people. These are the

three factors underpinning the Ukrainian calculation that

a form of ultimate victory remains achievable. Yet this clearly hinders the negotiations

mentioned at the outset. I must interrupt, Fabrice,

because these points suggest Ukraine is in a strong position

to attain victory. I'm sure that Russian perception of

the same situation is completely different. You're absolutely right. On the other side

of the board, the Russians are entirely convinced that the war

has become unsustainable for Ukraine. That leads me to elaborate on

the primary points of the Russian focus. We should note that this

diametric opposition in assessing the same situation,

while predictable, significantly hampers

negotiations. What are the three main points

on which the Russians base their belief that the war is becoming

unsustainable for the Ukrainians? I hasten to add that I am

deliberately using these parallel descriptions to highlight that

both belligerents remain convinced of

their capacity for victory. This poses a problem when trying

to find a way out of this war. The first point

is the evident failure of the Russian military

to achieve the announced objectives it had set for itself

leading into 2025. Admittedly, they sustained

very heavy losses. Granted, the scale of captured territory is

relatively small; however, an examination of

two particular instances provides necessary nuance. By October 2025, the Russian advance

took 65 km² of Ukrainian territory,

and the second week of November 2025 saw a sudden surge to 134 km²

of Ukrainian territory, which easily doubled the first week. One could argue that, given the areas

involved, this is still very modest. Yet two nuances may nevertheless need

to be put into perspective here. First, Moscow has clearly

changed its tactics. We must move beyond

the prevailing Western trope that Russia continues to

employ the Soviet-era doctrine of suicidal

infantry charges to secure marginal tactical objectives,

as it did during the Second World War. Because ultimately, after a while,

they would still manage to take a few square kilometres. Today, the Russian army no longer

operates in the same way. Russian troops now operate by

infiltrating small groups to avoid excessive losses and the great danger

posed by drones, which we discussed in previous sessions

on this war. This is exactly

why the map shows only incremental shifts, though the actual pressure

on the line is unrelenting. Following this initial remark,

it is clear that while the gnawing is gradual,

it remains constant and—crucially— always in the same direction. Consequently, we are left with the distinct

impression that the Russian military is intensifying its pressure

on the Ukrainian forces. That seems relatively

objective to highlight. There is also a second compelling point:

demographics. Yet this point on demographics

goes beyond a tally of losses. What do we see when we put this

demographic point into perspective? By comparison, the Russian population is

approximately around 143 million. Yet we don’t know the Ukrainian population. And that's key. I imagine some in our audience want to ask:

What do you mean, we don't know? Well, nobody knows. I assure you that I’ve checked

multiple sources. Basically, current

estimates place Ukraine’s population between 28 and 38 million. When you get such

wide range, it means that nobody knows. When the margin of error reaches 10 million

on a base of 28 to 38 million, it signals a major

instability in the data. Some sources even place

the figure below 28. To grasp where things stand

in these terms, we should note that

in 2022, before the invasion, Ukraine’s population—including both

Ukrainians and foreign nationals— stood at an estimated

41 million. That’s clearly

a huge loss. This leads to an inescapable question:

how can we account for such a massive decline

—one that clearly extends far beyond the tally of battlefield casualties—

and what explains the staggering gap

between 28 and 38. Here, we arrive at a critical juncture:

we must understand why this argument—one increasingly

weighed by the Russians—is so pivotal;

specifically, certain sources estimate that 10 million Ukrainians

have fled the country. While the numbers remain contentious,

we can look to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees

(UNHCR), an organisation of renowned professional rigour

whose impartiality in this conflict is widely respected.

This UN agency cites a figure of 5,100,000 Ukrainian

refugees on European soil. This figure rises to 5,600,000 when

considering all Ukrainian refugees in all countries around the world. That’s is more than

a considerable number. What would the Russians be

interested in this figure? From their perspective, this indicates

a profound weariness on the Ukrainian side, suggesting that morale is

flagging and the will to fight

is eroding. Another point the Russians

may utilise— —following our discussion

concerning the major events that happened in 2025—

is the fact that on 26 August 2025,

the Ukrainian government began allowing young men aged 18 to 22 to travel

internationally once more. Kyiv was reluctant to take this

step, even though the minimum age for conscription in the

Ukrainian military is 25. Quite clearly, the goal was

to stem a large-scale exodus of citizens who —to put it bluntly—

wished to dodge the draft and reality of war. Multiple reports point to

the same conclusion: 100,000 Ukrainians have

left the country and remain abroad. Thus, for the Russians,

this is an indication —and I say this purely analytically—

that there is a sense of terminal fatigue

among the Ukrainian population, who are consequently

nearing a breaking point. This accounts

for the third point on which the Russian are relying,

namely the heavy bombardment of Ukrainian urban centres like

Kyiv, with a particular focus on power stations and

the wider energy grid. At this point, the

objective is quite obvious, particularly as these strikes escalated in

January 2026—three days in particular. I am specifically thinking

of January 9th and 24th. It is quite clear that the intent is to plunge a

city of 4 million inhabitants—Kyiv—into darkness, but more crucially into the cold. Bear in mind, the temperature in Kyiv

right now is -20º. One can almost feel the distress at

the tightening vice of these combined pressures. They are doing so all the more because,

current evidence suggests Russian production

of drones, glide bombs and missiles

is accelerating, whereas Ukrainian air defences are becoming

less effective at repelling such sustained attacks. We are looking at

a situation where each side, based on a number of arguments, hopes that the other

will crack first. The picture is more nuanced than it appears,

as each side views the situation very differently. If we take all this as our compass,

what scenarios could we actually envision concerning

Russia and Ukraine in 2026? There are three. Considering the groundwork we’ve just

laid, I think these points won’t be particularly difficult to grasp. The first scenario would be

that of a Russian implosion— the disintegration of the army

and the continued implosion of Russian society. This scenario

relies more on arguments like the ones put forward by the Ukrainians. But why is this scenario not

so ridiculous to envision? Quite simply because it mirrors

the Russian army in 1917. If we put it into perspective,

we should recall that General Brusilov’s 1916 offensive

—while tactically successful against Austro-Hungarian forces—

incurred such staggering losses that it became

a Pyrrhic victory. The gains were insignificant compared

to the consequences, which ultimately shattered the morale and confidence

the Russians had placed in the Tsar. This perspective suggests

the brink of revolution. This event is clearly highlighted in

Alexandre Jevakhoff's La Guerre Civile Russe (The Russian Civil War: 1917-1922)

and that is exactly what is happening at this moment. On the other hand, of course,

the second scenario is the collapse of

the Ukrainian army. We must avoid dismissing this

scenario entirely, notwithstanding the apparent

hesitation of Western media and analysts to

contemplate this scenario. I think it’s appropriate to underscore this

‘hesitation to contemplate’, but in light of how things are perceived in

Russia, this is not entirely improbable. Then there is a third scenario

which, nonetheless, appears the most probable:

a situation where no clear victor emerges, leading to a

potential armistice followed by

a peace settlement involving various concessions. However, for this to happen, both sides

must be willing to make concessions that are at least

tolerable to their opponent. This scenario is all the more likely to succeed

because there is another player with some interest:

the United States of America. We should remember—and our

session will increasingly demonstrate this—that

this conflict did not emerge ex nihilo;

rather, it is inextricably linked to a broader set of external parameters. We must avoid the trap of

analysing conflicts in total isolation from their context. We must ground this analysis in

a set of specific, rational frameworks. Why would Washington be so interested in

the prospects of an armistice? Because from the US point of

view, it is essential to break up the burgeoning partnership

between Russia and China. Why would that be essential

for the Americans? They are banking on the fact

that a ceasefire would open the door to rebuilding a relationship with

Russia, with trade deals serving as the initial bridge. Washington’s real play here is to

flip Russia into an ally to help contain China on issues in

the Pacific and, particularly, Taiwan. We can base these comments

on two aspects: First,

you may recall a session we recorded on 24 February 2022, the day

the war broke out, and I remember the date well because

it shocked both of us. In that session, we examined

whether the rapprochement between Russia and China was a one-off, merely tactical approach,

or whether it would become a strategic rapprochement. It was incredible to do that

session on that day, wasn't it? Why would I recall that session? I made the point that, if you scratch

the surface, the actual points of convergence between Moscow and Beijing are rather thin. They even had a number of points of

divergence that made this alliance not necessarily automatic in the long term

or from a strategic point of view. This is exactly the lever the Americans are

pulling. They are applying the Kissinger Theorem,

which posits a landscape dominated by three

major powers —and we should admit that there are mainly

three major powers, namely China, the USA, and Russia. As Kissinger once quipped, you should

never be the one who stands alone. Let’s not forget what Kissinger means:

I am going to separate China, which was communist in 1972, from the USSR,

which was also communist in 1972. Ideology played no role. This is very important to point out

today. We tend to forget that in geopolitics,

alliances disregard ideologies. It is all about interests.

These are not questions of ideology. This is very important

to grasp in geopolitics. Kissinger noted that while both the Chinese and the

Soviets were communists, they seemed to have a number

of animosities. That fits in with what

we were saying earlier. The goal was to widen the antagonism

and bring China to the US side. Before he died, Henry Kissinger

said that the US should get closer to the Russians. At the time, he was criticised and

some wondered if he had changed his mind. No, he changed a player. He argued that China represented the

primary threat to US interests, which called for a strategic

pivot towards Moscow. This is a crucial point. We can clearly see

that US interest in an armistice is a genuine strategic

objective, rather than the mere presidential whim it is

so often portrayed to be. That's very important to keep in mind. This last scenario of an armistice

seems quite desirable. The warring sides would find common

ground, thus serving Washington’s strategic interests and ending the

loss of life on the ground. Why is it so complicated to implement? Perhaps because Vladimir Putin is

not interested. That’s especially striking

in the comments. The question is raised often. Very well, let’s try to put ourselves in the

shoes of the Russians and Vladimir Putin as a way to understand how

they might see things. Let’s start by briefly looking at

a point that is entirely consistent with what we examined previously,

and this may even sound a bit of a repetition. Given the arguments they have

presented, the Russians may reasonably believe that

despite the slight nibbling at the front line, they are not losing;

instead, they remain capable of of exerting significant pressure

on their adversary. Why, therefore, should they

rush to end the war when they believe they hold

a small but definite advantage? Their argument is at least plausible. I may not agree, but I understand. The second point is arguably

more significant and compelling. It also deserves

a much brighter spotlight. Indeed, this point

was addressed during a session that sought to answer the question of whether

Russia has a strategic culture. Because we need to understand

the mindset of the Russians. We must remember that history

and geography inevitably

shape strategic culture. When we reflect on this,

we first encounter Russia’s frustration stemming from

limited access to the seas. Russia is driven by

an obsession with reaching warm seas.

It is a profound geopolitical paradox that

although the country covers 17 million square kilometres

and is the world’s largest landmass, it lacks the maritime access

necessary to dominate a world that is 70% water. Because its

own coasts are largely frozen, Russia remains focused on

securing the warm-water ports it needs—hence its

logical obsession with the warm seas. A second point we examined in that

session is an arguably legitimate fear. I am referring to the pervasive

Russian apprehension regarding Western aggression; a historical concern

grounded in successive invasions, including those by the Teutonic

Knights, Charles XII of Sweden, Napoleon, and

the combatants of both world wars. What’s so important about

these historical facts? Because they ended up conceiving

not only the necessity, but the obsession with establishing a glacis. A glacis, in geopolitical terms,

is a type of intermediate buffer territory intended to absorb any

aggressive advance. This was the role of the Warsaw Pact countries,

such as East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, the former Czechoslovakia, Hungary,

and Romania, where the Soviet army maintained

a heavy presence. Now; why would I

bring that up? The presence of Western troops as guarantors

of Ukrainian security —a proposal often discussed—

remains an unthinkable condition for the Russians in

any armistice agreement. Such a deployment would be tantamount to

saying that the Russians—who claim they began the war precisely to

remove Ukraine from the NATO or European Union sphere of influence—

would now accept a situation where NATO and Europe's presence

would be stronger than it was in 2022, despite the territorial gains

the Russians have had. It is thus essential

to consider this factor, as it underscores a strategic perception

that is not exclusive to Vladimir Putin, but is shared by the entire Russian political and

military leadership. This view appears to be deeply

rooted in the Russian national psyche. Whether we regret it or

disagree with it, this reality seems to me to be entirely unavoidable. Crucially,

an armistice would end the war and could

ultimately lead to peace. However, does an authoritarian power

truly benefit from ending the war? Unfortunately, in a time of war,

the entire society of such a power is

focused on the conflict, inevitably influenced by

the prevailing propaganda. The risk its leader faces in ending

this conflict is that the population

may no longer be mobilised by the struggle; instead, they may suddenly

find the opportunity to question both the true reasons for

the conflict and what was actually achieved. They could also ask whether the

current government legitimately and adequately conduct the war. Ultimately, it becomes apparent that ending

this war could prompt the Russian populace to

scrutinise the legitimacy of Vladimir Putin’s power. I am not entirely sure that

Russian leaders would be very inclined to take that risk. Thus, within the framework of an

armistice, there may be an incentive to redirect

focus towards external theatres to forestall such domestic scrutiny. One theatre may be the Baltic states. Let's take the question from another angle. Are there any factors that could

persuade Vladimir Putin to consider the possibility of an armistice? Yes. What makes this especially

interesting is that there are actually three distinct factors

that could lead Vladimir Putin to reconsider this

prospect and question whether an armistice is truly advisable. I suggest we examine these

three factors one by one. What are they? Let’s begin with a factor that

we have not yet highlighted in this session. This factor is linked to macroeconomics. There are legitimate grounds to question

what the real situation of the Russian economy is today. This question is both crucial and

problematic because we are finding that the experts

do not agree at all. Many of

them believe that after four years, the economic sanctions imposed by

Washington and Europe —while taking much longer

than expected— are finally beginning to bear fruit. There are also a growing number of experts who

sense that the Russian economy is teetering on the edge of an abyss, which

is a haunting prospect to the Russian authorities, especially

with the ghost of 1917 still looming in the background. But regardless

of where things stand exactly from a

macroeconomic perspective, if I may, Olivier, I believe

there are other questions we need to ask —questions that I feel are not being

sufficiently addressed in the Western media. Because that is a fact. The first: is this fact

being reported objectively? Is it being reported to

Vladimir Putin? First question. Now the second:

does Vladimir Putin want to hear it? That's the second question. To my point: does any particular

adviser currently have Putin’s ear?

Is there a wizard in the Kremlin? I draw that image from Giuliano da Empoli’s novel The Wizard

of the Kremlin (2022). Is there a wizard in the

Kremlin with the authority and power to pull back the curtain and speak

the truth about the Russian economy? That, once again, is a point that I feel

is not being raised often enough. There’s a gap between objective

facts and what can be reported. This assumes an affirmative answer

to those macroeconomic questions, potentially indicating

an initial slowdown. Yet, a secondary effect

exists which Emmanuel Todd, in The Defeat of the West (Le défaite de

l’Occident), uniquely identifies and elucidates with such precision. The fact is that we have only

addressed two aspects of demographics. I’ll explain: conflict-related loss on the one hand;

actual demographic ratio of the population on the other. I didn’t specify that earlier,

but the overall ratio is 1 for the Ukrainians and

about 4.3 for the Russians. In terms of losses?

In terms of population. OK; in terms of population. In terms of population. Let’s stick with these two aspects. But it's important that you asked me

to clarify because it allows us to see, in terms of reserves, what

each country's respective reserves would be, which could explain why

the Russians think they have the long-term advantage. This ultimately takes us back, with your clarification, Olivier,

to the point that Emmanuel Todd

raised in his book. So far we haven't mentioned

fertility rates and birth rates. However, if we look at

the fertility and birth rates in Russia

since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989

—focusing strictly on Russian territories

to ensure a fair comparison—

we see that the population

isn't growing. Even in peacetime,

Russia struggled to maintain its fertility and birth

rates, which are exceptionally low and cannot maintain the

Russian population at the same level. What that means is that

these losses are incredibly detrimental. Since the Russian population

was already struggling to maintain its numbers

in peacetime, the long-term impact on fertility and birth rates

might lead Vladimir Putin to reconsider

the wisdom of a prolonged conflict,

which we can clearly see has a very significant impact on Russian

demographics, once again in terms of fertility and birth rates. We’ve now shone a light on the demographic

landscape from 3 different vantage points, which is crucial. One last point:

the war is still going on. What does this

statement mean? This brings us back to our sessions on

Sun Tzu and Clausewitz, where we showed that both

strategists believe that if you are forced to go to war,

you’ve already lost. So now, you've been at war for four years. And the idea is:

even if you win, who have you won? Clausewitz, as we know, defined

war as the continuation of politics by other means; therefore,

looking at his work alongside Sun Tzu’s, the goal is to achieve your aim

and find an exit as fast as possible. In this regard, now with the image of

these two strategists displayed on each side of the screen,

they may be asking: after four years of war, have you

considered the scale of the destruction, the staggering losses,

the economic fallout, and the diplomatic strain

you are mired in? We’ll inevitably reach a juncture

where we must put an end to it, particularly as a

final point emerges: paradoxically, continuation may no longer align with

Chinese interests, thus incentivising

Vladimir Putin’s withdrawal. We must never forget that when you are allied

with someone, it is usually due to geopolitical necessity

and dependence rather than friendship. However, the problem with

the current alliance is that the longer the war lasts,

the more Russia becomes dependent on China for its

economy, trade and equipment.

Conversely, the Chinese have realised that as long as

the Americans are preoccupied with this conflict,

they have less capacity to monitor developments in the Pacific. Consequently, there are several factors

that could lead the Russians to reconsider

their position, despite the initial outlook discussed earlier. With the conflict now entrenched,

and an elusive end not entirely in sight, the real question is: what will happen if,

and when, the fighting finally stops? That, ultimately, is the major question. That’s what I wanted to convey as part

of our title: Where do things stand? After four years of

being bogged down in a conflict that seems destined

for trench warfare —a war of position—

there is a sense that we must simply accept its presence

and turn our attention elsewhere. We are thus facing

many perspectives and questions. First, how will the conflict end? How will things stand with the

military balance and political decisions? Following on from my question,

what position and status will these unavoidable decisions

eventually give to Ukraine? A position of more or less neutrality? Entry into the European Union

or into the fold of NATO? With the presence of

European forces or not? And following that thread, we arrive

at a question currently left in the shadows: what kind of hand will Europe extend to a Russia

that has finally laid down its arms? What geopolitical structure

is being proposed? It is imperative to remind those observers who

tend to categorise nations as permanent belligerents that

geographical reality is a decisive factor; Russia remains

the terrestrial extension of Europe, and eventually, a strategy

must be formulated for a state that will

perpetually exist on the European frontier. We are thus confronted with a series of

enquiries that will inextricably influence not only the future of relations

between Europe and the USA, but also the trajectory of European

integration itself. However, we must also consider

a real second player. I’m thinking of one specific country:

China. I’d also like to address this

factor through questions. Because ultimately,

over the last five or six weeks, three very important

questions have emerged. I believe we should

keep them in mind. First, what do these repeated and increasingly

significant reshuffles of the

Chinese high command over the past few weeks and

months actually signify? I should point out that

these personnel changes have expanded in scope,

now encompassing the most senior tiers of

the Chinese military command structure. These are therefore very

significant reshuffles. Secondly, what is the significance of

Xi Jinping's address that began on New Year's Eve, thus

on 31 December but ended about ten minutes into 2026? It was clearly aimed at

Westerners, given the use of the Western calendar,

and we cannot fail to notice that images of the Chinese

army were highlighted and Taiwan was reminded that

it remains a target for China. In the same vein,

how can we not also question the significance of

the hour-and-a-half-long Chinese parade on 3 September 2025?

It was a display of power that was,

to say the least, obvious. But then, perhaps we should turn these

questions on their head to see how they mirror the very issue

we are examining today. Perhaps our audience is asking

another question: where is heading with all this? We can certainly ask: if the massive changes

in the Chinese high command, alongside this blatant desire to show off

their power—and the word ‘desire’ is key— actually points to a real

weakness—the very paradox we touched on before. In this regard, I’ll cite Allison’s Destined

for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides'

Trap? We cannot really say that the

title is uninspiring, can we? Certainly,

Graham Allison wanted this title to tell us: there is a risk

of war because the established power is always afraid of being overtaken

by the challenging power. But here, we could point out that

suddenly, there is an impression that Beijing seems to be doubting its power

and is wondering whether they are really looking at real window of opportunity

to be seized now, particularly concerning Taiwan, before it's too late. There is clearly a risk in this regard. Should this be true,

there is a risk of being confronted with two simultaneous crises:

an intractable conflict between

Ukraine and Russia, and an increasingly imminent threat

of warfare in Taiwan. Consequently,

we run the risk of conflicts that are no longer isolated from one another,

but rather interconnected, precipitating

a state of war that I would categorise as global rather than worldwide. That, in fact, is the real risk

we are currently facing. If I wanted to hammer this point home,

I would also have to mention that on Wednesday,

4 February 2026, official media in both countries

reported a communication between

Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping. In this exchange, Xi Jinping himself stressed

the importance of strengthening bilateral cooperation,

which confirms —for anyone still in doubt—

that the prospect of strategic cooperation

between Russia and China is very much alive. All of these signals, to my mind,

sharpen the point of the question we’ve asked today

and the need for a swift reckoning: Where exactly do

things stand? This is necessary to prevent the conflict

from dragging on too long and ultimately yield deleterious consequences for

the rest of the world. Fabrice, it is common to open

geopolitical meetings with a question: where do things stand? While it is less common to finish on

so many questions, they have succeeded in opening up a range of deep

and complex insight for further thought. I think we will see the value of

continuing along these lines in a future session.

Thank you, Fabrice. Thank you. That wraps up this session of

Rendez-vous de la Géopolitique. Thank you all

for following us.