FRANCE- ETATS-UNIS : d'un lien singulier à un rapport classique

France-USA: from unique bond

to conventional relations. At RDVG, we’ve

occasionally examined bilateral relations, for example:

Franco-German relations. Our focus today is the bond between France

and the USA, which is set to commemorate its

250th anniversary. This session belongs to a wider anniversary

series on American strategic culture, but to provide the

necessary context, we first need to explore the foundations

of the Franco-American relationship with Fabrice Ravel. Fabrice, hello.

Hello Olivier. Hello everyone. We are launching

a dedicated series of videos, starting with

an analysis from a uniquely French viewpoint

to explore how the relationship with the USA

has developed over time. I think we should start with a brief

historical overview to set the scene. Indeed, starting with an

historical overview is essential, as the very title of our session points

to a bond often called unique —leaving us to wonder if it is now

moving towards something more conventional. Something does seem to be changing. It is essential to understand

the nature of this change. To do that, we need to look back at

the key historical stages to see which events have

either bolstered or altered Franco-American relations. I believe there are

five key stages we should highlight to help us address

this question. I would call

the first stage an exceptional singularity,

since the term ‘exceptional’ clearly carries a very strongly positive

connotation and reinforces the initial period, spanning between 1776 and 1812. That would take us

right into a second stage, which could be described as a close

bond that was not undermined by occasional divergences. This stage covers the period

from 1917 to 1956. Of course, I’ll explain the choice

of this particular timeframe. This is followed by a third stage

—a period of differentiation, notwithstanding a continued

broader strategic agreement. This roughly spans between 1958 and 1989–1991. This leads to the penultimate stage, which

marks a genuine turning point: a period between 2003 and 2005

defined by very pronounced differences. Finally, we move to

the fifth stage, covering the contemporary period; this follows the theme

of our title—a relationship that has now become ‘conventional’. I should point out that this term might

instinctively be seen as a positive one. It is worth examining this

from several angles, especially through a geopolitical lens,

which may reveal that the title is not quite as positive

as it may have appeared at first blush. Indeed. I wonder if you

could take us back to that point, to the beginning so we can

grasp the exceptional nature of the ties between France and the USA

when the country was born. Lafayette, we are here. To illustrate this period,

we should recall the words attributed to

General Pershing on 4 July 1917 at the Marquis de Lafayette’s

graveside. The symbolism is immensely

powerful and highlights —from the outset—

the bonds forged between these two nations.

These ties are on a different scale from any others; in other words, we are

dealing with a truly unique bond. What makes this situation so

unique right from the outset? We are looking at the American

War of Independence of 1776; to get straight to the point,

France was the only country willing to help

the United States secure its independence in 1776. Obviously, there is a very strong bond here. It is crucial to address a common

misconception from the start. We often rely on

a retrospective narrative —particularly in the

French context—which frames the intervention as

a noble crusade to export democratic values to

the United States. This doesn't quite align with the actual historical context. However, keep in mind that

in 1776, it was the Marquis de Lafayette

—and his title alone should tell you that the French monarchy

was the one supporting the revolution. This is a key detail for later. We are

essentially departing from the logic of classical geopolitics;

rather than France simply helping the American rebels

to spite the British —given their long-standing disputes—

we must remember that the United States was, at its core,

originally a British colony. That, too, is very important to emphasise. A second essential point

is something that simply does not get enough airtime:

throughout this 250-year history, France is

the only major European power that has never engaged

in a formal war against the USA. Because, obviously, Germany was

at war with the United States twice, during the First and Second World Wars. That’s so obvious

that I’ll move on quickly. The United Kingdom was at war with the

United States twice: during the War of Independence in 1776, and again in 1812. It’s a little-known, yet very important fact. Italy was at war with the United States

during the Second World War, and Spain was at war with the United States

during a major geopolitical crisis in 1898 involving Cuba. It’s thus clear that Germany,

the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain have all been at war with

the United States at different times, but never France. This places the Franco-American relationship

in a completely unique light from the outset.

Not only was France the sole power to help the Americans

achieve independence—hence Independence Day—

but it is also the only European power never to have been at war with the USA. To truly

underscore how unique these ties are, two other events are worth mentioning

—both of which I find deeply significant. Firstly, there is the 1803 sale of

Louisiana to the United States by Napoleon Bonaparte, who was then First Consul. It is worth clarifying that

the historical Louisiana Territory that France sold the USA

was vastly larger than the modern-day borders

of the current US state of Louisiana. One might even argue that this

forged an even stronger bond; after all,

it is thanks to France that the United States added extra stars to its flag, and

that is certainly no small matter. It’s worth noting that

the French objective was as much to satisfy the Americans

as it was to embarrass the British. Napoleon, in his strategic brilliance,

understood that maintaining a French presence in these territories

was impossible given the dominance of the British Royal Navy. Therefore,

the only way to prevent the English from returning to the Americas was,

paradoxically, to sell these territories to the Americans

—a move that further strengthened the ties between

France and the fledgling American state. The third point

is a crucial one: in 1812,

the United States suffered the only military defeat in its history

when the British landed on the American coast during a major conflict. Why would that bolster ties

between France and the USA? Because France and the USA were

de facto allies in 1812, the year of Napoleon’s Russian campaign.

Because Russia was allied with London, France and the USA

were effectively in the same camp with a shared strategic outlook. We are therefore seeing the emergence

of a relationship that is unparalleled in the history of nations

within the realm of geopolitics. This first stage thus covers

the years from 1776 to 1812. Clearly, the next stage entails

a significant leap forward in time. Why? Because on 2 December 1823,

James Monroe, the fifth US President, delivered a speech that

articulated the Monroe Doctrine. In essence, this policy

committed the USA to a path of isolationism. However, the fundamental relationship remained intact, despite inevitable frictions. A prime example is France's attempt to forge

closer ties with Mexico under Napoleon III. We should also consider

the concerns shared by both Britain and

France during the American Civil War between

May 1861 and May 1865. Yet, we are witnessing the emergence of

a truly exceptional relationship —one which, as I have

noted, established a demonstrably unique dynamic from the very outset. Let’s now turn to that close bond

of the second stage. As your opening

remarks suggested, this close bond

was punctuated by real differences. This closeness

is fairly easy to highlight since the period in question, as mentioned previously,

is 1917–1956. Why 1917? Because, to follow on from my earlier

point, this was when the USA moved away from the Monroe

Doctrine and isolationism, becoming fully involved in the First World War. Naturally, they were fighting alongside the French. This was when General Pershing

supposedly spoke with rare poetic flair—though the words

are merely attributed to him— with the words:

Lafayette, we are here. This is a crucial point that

I may revisit: it shows a clear

American consciousness of 'repaying a debt'

for past support. And even over a century later, we are here. We didn’t forget you; we are here. That’s really something I think

we should bear in mind. In the subsequent Second World War,

Washington came to the rescue a second time. This led into the Marshall Plan era

—though we should be clear that the Plan was designed for all of Europe,

not just France, and was framed by the onset of

the Cold War. It was not, therefore, simply a matter

of altruism; rather, the USA had a clear vested interest in the outcome. Despite these remarks,

a deep bond clearly exists, underscored by the fact that

France and the United States were aligned

in both world wars. It is noteworthy, however,

that several disagreements had

begun to emerge. Frictions are becoming apparent

—to borrow a Clausewitzian term, albeit one more traditionally

associated with military tactics. For a start, we can see that

various disagreements were already surfacing in the 1920s and 1930s over how the post-First World War era

was being managed. A palpable sense of frustration

existed on the French side, particularly

rooted in the perception that the Americans failed to grasp France’s situation

—particularly its demographic disadvantage relative to Germany. Then there were the issues that really

soured relations between the two sides, specifically the scale of German reparations

and the question of how to repay the massive loans

the Americans had issued. Gérard Araud’s Nous étions seuls

(We Were Alone), a diplomatic history of the 1919–1939 period, perfectly captures

this sense of French isolation. There was clearly

a shared 'Anglo-Saxon' mindset between the

Americans and the British; neither wanted to see Germany weakened so much

that France would become a dominant power in Europe. That, in itself, is a significant

point worth highlighting. Another noteworthy phenomenon,

albeit one rooted in a psychological context, was the profound shock felt by the Americans

at the Fall of France in 1940. We have to remember that,

despite their isolationism, the Americans

weren't closely following military developments.

They still saw the French Army as the 'great victor' of WWI and the gold

standard of military power: the champions. When that image shattered,

it led to a complete loss of confidence—a shift that is essential

for understanding what followed. The Americans relied on the French Army

to defend their interests in Europe. This is a crucial statement. When, in the five weeks from 10 May 1940

until the armistice at Rethondes on 22 June 1940, France collapsed in six weeks

due to the Blitzkrieg, Paul Reynaud, then

President of the Council (the Third Republic’s

equivalent to a Prime Minister), found himself

overwhelmed. He begged the Americans to set aside their neutrality and send ammunition,

guns, and planes. Roosevelt’s reply was rather cryptic,

essentially: We’re praying for you, yet he took no action. Crucially, 1940

was an election year; Roosevelt was bound by his pledge to keep

the United States out of the war. So here we have a second

wound, so to speak, which was only deepened by the fact that

—considering the sheer weight of the US contribution

to the victory— there was clearly going to be a

shift in the hierarchy of military and geopolitical

power. Moreover, differences of opinion were arising over how

France should exit its empire. By 1945, it was obvious that the colonial

system was doomed, De Gaulle’s Brazzaville speech notwithstanding. The real

priority, therefore, was to create the best possible

conditions to end the French colonial Empire. But it was also a source of friction.

While the Americans were well aware that the Indochina War could

be viewed through the lens of the Cold War, which allowed for Franco-American harmony,

it was increasingly seen through a postcolonial lens instead; and one event would

prove to be of major significance. That major event is

the Suez Canal crisis between late October 1956 and 7 November 1956. Here, it is essential to recall the facts.

This was the final occasion —as I shall discuss later, as it is precisely

how André Fontaine frames the matter—on which France and the UK

acting in concert, took a unilateral initiative without

consulting the Americans. They did so in the belief that they were

still major world powers, capable of decision-making. To summarise: after Nasser nationalised the

Suez Canal, Paris and London signed a secret treaty, allied themselves with

Israel, which then launched an attack. Officially, France and Britain were meant to be

separating the warring parties. But in truth, their paratroopers were dropped

directly over the Suez Canal with the goal of retaking it. Facing pressure from Moscow and

Washington, London and Paris were told to withdraw with the

utmost haste —within 48 hours. The Americans pointed out

that, for one thing, they weren’t warned; and here, clearly the term ‘warn’ carries

a weightier underlying implication —specifically, of ‘seeking permission’.

Having attempted to cast off the tutelage of the pre-eminent

Western power, as it were, the USA was essentially saying: since you have taken

this liberty, we won’t protect you any longer. Consequently, France and the UK

—facing a threat from the USSR, then allied with Egypt—withdrew in haste, turning

a clear military success into a political defeat. That’s a very deep wound. It is becoming

increasingly evident that this will fast-track European integration. While this is a separate subject, its

geopolitical implications are often understated; we should recall that the

Treaty of Rome dates back to 25 March 1957. We’re clearly proceeding along a similar path. To appreciate the full

magnitude of this crisis, I should mention

André Fontaine’s two-volume history of the Cold War,

which maps how much relations between the two countries

are deteriorating. The second volume on the Cold War,

the Korean War to the Alliance Crises, is a key starting point here. It covers the history of the Cold War

broadly from 1950 to 1963. What is striking about

the subtitle ‘Alliance Crises’ is that it encompasses more than

just Franco-American relations, it also covers Sino-Soviet relations,

pointing to a broader realignment of

international ties. His third volume,

‘One Bed for Two Dreams: A History of Détente’, is

of particular interest as it provides a retrospective analysis of the

foundations of détente from 1962 through to 1981. The fourth chapter of the third volume, titled

with specific reference to France—and indeed, France alone

— is especially noteworthy (page 67 of the French edition). The title is:

The World’s Troublemaker. So, when a French

person highlights this, it naturally makes one wonder what the US perception of

France’s stance on the matter was. At this point, however,

it’s clear that a major event is unfolding—a transition that is set

to take us into a third stage. Yes, because we began

with a closeness marked by differences. Now, there is a distancing between the two,

despite the backdrop of strategic agreements between

the United States and France. The term ‘distancing’ is very important. Crucially, we must also

explain the roots of this distancing, as it was driven largely by

France's domestic political situation. Perhaps in the subsequent stages,

it will be due more to domestic politics in the USA. Why? Why, then, should this new phase

begin in 1958 rather than 1956, where we last left off? France was in the midst of a profound

political crisis —one so severe that the

Fourth Republic’s President called on General de Gaulle

to return to power as President of the Council.

The National Assembly ratified the appointment on 3 June 1958. This shift is a vital point of emphasis;

it marks the implementation of

General de Gaulle’s signature foreign policy—the principle that France should

be an ally of the United States without being

subservient to American hegemony. The consequences were far-reaching:

on 7 March 1966, de Gaulle withdrew France from NATO’s integrated

military command. This move was made possible

by the fact that France had already tested its

first nuclear weapon in 1960. We can clearly see here that France

is following a unique trajectory. It continues to assert its own international

role—distinct from that of the United States—

by occasionally adopting stances that are at odds with American policy. On the other hand, it is worth noting that

while the previous stage saw a synergy of overlapping interests,

we still remained within a single framework. While a certain distance

is emerging here, France and the USA remain in close alignment

—and are very much on the same page—

when it comes to the most crucial issues. I believe we can illustrate this through

two examples and three specific actions. The first is the Cuban Missile Crisis in the

autumn of 1962. General de Gaulle explicitly

informed Kennedy that France supported the United States throughout

the standoff, assuring the US President of his total personal support. This is vital,

echoing an earlier point: de Gaulle did not hesitate for

a moment. In the frozen grip of the Cold War, and faced with such consequential stakes,

any hesitation or tempering of his support was simply out of the question. Another event of interest here is

one shaped by the hand of François Mitterrand. François Mitterrand stressed this

twice in 1983. What am I referring to?

Specifically, his famous speech at the German Bundestag

on 20 January 1983. Remember that François Mitterrand had

Communist ministers in his government and we were in the midst of the Cold War. Addressing an assembly of hesitant German MPs

—the footage is quite telling— Mitterrand insisted that peace can only be maintained through

a balance of power. This is a crucial point in

geopolitical dialectics. He argued that

it was essential to deploy American Pershing missiles, marking

what is truly one of history’s great ironies. These American Pershing missiles

—named for General Pershing— were intended to restore strategic nuclear

parity against the Soviet SS-20s. On 13 October 1983,

during a state visit with

King Baudouin in Brussels, Mitterrand delivered a speech that

remains overshadowed by his Bundestag address, yet contains

a devastatingly sharp insight: The pacifists are in the West,

but the missiles are in the East. Clearly,

at these defining moments, France stands its solidarity

with the USA. There is a final event in

this sequence worth mentioning: the First Gulf War.

When the conflict broke out, lasting from August 1990 to

February 1991, President François Mitterrand fully committed France to

the operation, joining Washington in the war effort. France was not alone, but it stood

firmly with the Americans. It is clear that while a rift

was developing, on the major strategic and geopolitical issues,

the alliance remained intact. Ultimately,

despite the friction, there was continuity. Looking to the next stage,

however, I am far from certain that we can maintain our

previous trajectory. Deep and genuine

differences are now emerging, and the distance between the two sides is growing. Indeed, this fourth

and penultimate stage—as previously outlined—

signals not merely a distancing, but a

genuine divergence in underlying logic. We are seeing a shift in

the strategies and solutions deemed necessary for geopolitical order. Why start this stage in 2003? Because as many of you will realise,

the decade following the Cold War felt like a time when

the very idea of geopolitics had vanished. Whether you date the end

of that era to the fall of the Berlin Wall

on 9 November 1989, or to Mikhail Gorbachev’s resignation on 25 December 1991,

we entered a period famously summarised by Francis Fukuyama as

‘the end of history’ in his work:

The End of History and the Last Man. We believed the

power struggle was over; and therefore, there was no reason

for relations between the USA and France to be particularly strained. However, by the start of 2003,

the situation had changed completely. Why? The reason lies in the American plan to invade

Iraq for a second time. On this occasion, France took a position

famously defined by the Foreign Minister’s speech

to the UN Security Council on 14 February 2003. It is worth noting that in France,

this speech is held in very high esteem; it is both passionate and lyrical.

In it, France took the opportunity to advise the United States,

suggesting that the 'old' European nations —with their long history of conflict—

were well-placed to offer lessons to the Americans,

and that the USA would be better off

staying out of the Iraqi conflict. Except that in this case, the form

is overshadowing the substance. Why do I say this? Well, I am rather more sceptical about

the significance of this argument than most. After all, what can we

expect from friends and allies? Do we expect them

to publicly denounce you, so ostentatiously,

before the entire United Nations? Or do we rather expect them to leverage

a quiet moment of complicity to say: Listen, you know how important our

ties have been throughout history. ‘You know our history of

standing by you, but in this instance, we must tell you frankly:

we believe you are making a mistake’. To be perfectly clear, would it not have been

better for the French President to have said this himself? He did eventually attempt

to do so, but the moment had already passed. The American response was

immediate—an exchange frequently overlooked in the French narrative. The US representative may well

have pointed out that, in terms of the age of democracy,

the United States predated France. We arrive once again at a famous turning

point: France only became a democracy 13 years later, in 1789. In my view,

the timing was exceptionally clumsy, particularly after

11 September 2001, as the Americans were still in no state to

hear such a speech. Even if we were right on the substance,

we should have waited for the right moment. Once the operation was

underway and the Americans began to face their first real difficulties,

we could have said to them: ‘Look,

we are now ready to offer you a way out’. Geopolitics requires a keen sense of

timing; one must know precisely when a message will resonate. Here, it was flawed in both

form and timing. Moreover, beyond this initial

friction, which inevitably carried

substantial consequences, we must acknowledge that the

USA ultimately ignored the French intervention and proceeded with the invasion anyway. I would further suggest that in

geopolitics, when a nation is powerless,

it is not necessarily wise to stubbornly highlight that impotence to the global stage. France’s actions served only

to demonstrate that its rhetoric, however impassioned, exerted zero

influence over Washington. That was a dramatic situation. I highlight it here because

it is a viewpoint seldom discussed within France itself. Furthermore,

an additional layer will soon exacerbate these evident frictions:

the shifting nature of America’s own

strategic priorities. US strategic choices will shift

during the Obama presidency. The implications here are profound, rooted in

what we know as the 'pivot' strategy. The 'pivot' is a metaphor drawn from

Barack Obama’s passion for basketball: it entails a player who,

while facing one way, suddenly wheels around to find

a clear path to the basket. What are we actually

seeing here? While the US had at

one time been focused on Europe, the rise of China is now

the primary concern. Consequently, Washington is pivoting

towards the Pacific —shifting its gaze away from Europe to

focus more on Asia in general, and China in particular. We are now seeing a trend that

naturally leads to an even greater distancing of relations. We should also consider Donald Trump’s

first term between 2016 and 2020; we’re well aware of how critical he was

of NATO and the nature of his relations with European countries in this context. It’s also worth noting that during the Biden

presidency, even though the tone was much more conciliatory,

it was made quite clear that the focus remained very much on China. Let's look back at Biden’s speech where he

justified withdrawing from Afghanistan by the need to focus more on China. We actually highlighted this

in two sessions we dedicated to Afghanistan. This represents a USA that is distancing

itself from previous commitments, driven by a new strategic framework. Suddenly, we’ve reached a stage

that marks a significant turning point; it might partly explain the situation

we find ourselves in today. We started out with a unique relationship,

but in this current stage, we are moving towards a conventional relationship. Framed like that, you might assume that

a conventional relationship is synonymous with uneventful, and thus peaceful. This final stage I want to cover is obviously

the most important, since it’s the one that brings us right up to

the present day, from 2025 onwards. I’ll explain why up to the present day. Naturally, the term

'conventional relationship' implies a cooling of tensions. We might even

instinctively assume that, following the preceding stage, which

seemed marred by turbulence, we’ve gone back to the norm—a return to the status quo. I should point out that this

isn’t a normalisation at all. It’s actually a banalisation. So now, this concept

suddenly takes on a distinctly pejorative tone in geopolitics, since

what defines a conventional relationship between two states? It is a relationship that is

governed solely by respective interests and geopolitical calculations, stripped

of any unique bond between the two nations. Ultimately, then, we have moved

from a singular bond to a banal one. But that’s hardly positive at all. So, how can we explain this situation? To understand this shift, we should

return to our retrospective of the

Trump administration’s first year in office,

where, in our previous sessions, we brought up the

strategic document adopted by Washington in December 2025. The most revealing aspect of this

document is its first chapter dedicated to the Western Hemisphere.

Europe was pointedly excluded from this grouping. Europe—and, by extension, France—

was relegated to a separate chapter entirely. And not only that,

as we established in that session —and I would suggest watching it again,

if necessary— the United States no longer presented itself as

a providential power with a historic mission to spread democracy and freedom, but rather

just another conventional player in the geopolitical arena. This goes to

the heart of the matter: the United States is lapsing into banality,

reinventing itself as a purely conventional actor,

which is a far cry from the eras of

Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt. The relationship is becoming

increasingly banal because the role Washington wants to play in

geopolitics actually reflects its own internal situation and

US domestic politics. Even the Americans are viewing themselves as

having a more conventional role. Will the Americans and

the French be capable of preserving a bond that is as singular as it is unique,

a relationship that remains without parallel in the history of modern civilisation? This is indeed the vital question we must

pose in 2026, as the United States celebrates the

250th anniversary of its founding. This question becomes all the more

vital because, frankly, the current geopolitical landscape is

desperate for solutions. It is a reality that will place immense strain

on every nation currently grappling with a climate

increasingly fraught with anxiety and, more crucially,

hostility. Thank you, Fabrice. Another observation struck me during

this session: the question of diplomacy—or rather,

the art of diplomacy— as inextricably linked to historical depth

and a refined sense of tact in geopolitical dealings and relations between states. I suggest that, at some stage, we take the

opportunity to reflect on diplomacy and geopolitics.

Thank you, Fabrice. Thank you. That wraps up this session of

Rendez-Vous de la Géopolitique. Thank you all

for following us.